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FEDERAL COURTS-CHOICE oF LAw-.APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW

To GOVERNMENT StmcoNTRAcr IN FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASE - Defendant
obtained a government missile contract, and plaintiff was subcontracted
to manufacture containers for the missiles. When certain changes in
elements of the containers were ordered by the Government, plaintiff
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demanded an "equitable adjustment" from defendant pursuant to the
terms of the subcontract. Defendant paid only the costs of effecting
the necessary changes. Plaintiff instituted this suit in federal district
court alleging diversity of citizenship and demanding that the adjustment
include, as allowed by California law, compensation for overhead losses
caused by a partial work stoppage during the delay in effecting the
changes. The district court characterized the contract as a government
contract, held that federal rather than state law applied, and found for
defendant on the merits.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. Although the
subcontract cannot be characterized as a government contract, federal
law should be applied for its interpretation since the federal interest in
national security requires a uniform federal rule for the construction of
such government subcontracts. American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961).
The doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins2 is that state law applies to
actions in the federal courts, "except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide."3
The express exception4 to the rule has been found to include: suits
involving rights or obligations of the government on its commercial
instruments5 or contracts,6 suits involving the rights or obligations
created by government instruments as between private parties,7 and suits
in which the policy of federal statutes requires a uniform federal rule
governing the transactions which they affect.8 Until this decision it
186 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1960) •
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 Federal Rules of Decision Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958): "The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the federal courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
4 See Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines of State Law in the Federal Courts, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955) ; Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of
Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946) •
5 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). For a discussion of the
questionable constitutional basis for this rule, see Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of
Federal Common Law, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953).
6 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) ("general contract law"
applied without even considering state law) •
7 Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 27 (1956). It is interesting that the Court
held that federal law applied only to the rights created by the bonds, and that the
issue of burden of proof of good faith of defendants in presenting the bonds was held
to be controlled by state law. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction: Law Applicable to Government Instruments, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 212 (1957) •
s In Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), it was held that the
question of whether a patent licensee was estopped to deny the validity of his licensor's
patent and avoid a price-fixing agreement was governed by federal law because of
federal anti-trust policy; and in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942),
federal law was held applicable to determine the validity of a note given to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation as part of a surreptitious scheme because of the strong
policy of the statutes creating that agency to protect it from fraud.
1
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had been accepted as settled that suits between private parties to government subcontracts were within the Erie rule and that state law would
be applied; 9 but the court's opinion makes it clear that it regards this
case to be within the federal-policy category of the exception. However,
the prior cases within that category involved statutes or policies of
statutes which went to the merits of the controversy,10 and it is difficult
to find any federal statutes which touch upon the construction of equitable adjustment provisions in government subcontracts, or which express
a controlling federal policy necessitating a uniform federal rule in this
situation. The court referred to the probability that the prime contract
provided for an equitable adjustment, which might reflect the adjustment
made under the subcontract thereby increasing the cost of national
security. Although the court adverted to the policy of Congress to reduce
the cost of defense, which is manifested in the Renegotiation Act,11
it is apparent that the policy of the Renegotiation Act does not bear upon
the construction or effect of the equitable adjustment provision of the
subcontract. The act merely provides that contracts and subcontracts
let under the authority of certain government agencies shall be subject
to review after performance in order that excessive profits may be eliminated. Since this suit was instituted for compensation of losses, the
considerations of a review to ascertain excessive profits seems somewhat
remote from the issue being determined. Furthermore, under the act
the function of determining excessiveness of profits is not delegated to
the courts but rather is invested in the Renegotiation Board appointed
by the President whose findings are subject only to redetermination by
the Tax Court. 12 Since nothing in the act bears upon the issue under
consideration, and no other statutes or manifestations of federal policy are
suggested by the court to require the uniformity urged by the defendant,
o Ogden Elec. Co. v. Engineers Ltd., 151 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1945); Cuneo, Disputes
Between Subcontractors and Prime Contractors Under Government Contracts, 16 Fm.
B.J. 246, 259-61 (1956); Steele, Choice of Law, State or Federal in Government Subcontracts, id. at 202. The general rule also appears to be applicable to suits brought
under the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1958) • Uaited
States ex rel. Lichter v. Henke Constr. Co., 157 F.2d 13 (8th Cir. 1946); United States
ex rel. Gillioz v. John Kerns Constr. Co., 50 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Ark. 1943), rev'd. on
other grounds, 140 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1944). But see Liebman v. United States ex rel.
California Elec. Supply Co., 153 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1946); United States ex rel. Glickfeld
v. Krendel, 136 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1955); United States ex rel. Hargis v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 64 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Cal. 1946) .
10 The language of many of the decisions suggests that the presence of a "federal
question" is the basis for the choice of law decision. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson
Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); D'Oench, Duhme &: Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456
(1942); Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008, 1011 (2d Cir. 1951).
11 Renegotiation Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1211-33
(1958).
12 Renegotiation Act of 1951, § 108, 65 Stat. 21, as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1218
(1958).
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there is little to support the application of federal law in this case
except the statement of the court that federal interests are involved
which require the protection of federal law.1a
Assuming that the "accident" of diversity had been missing from this
case, the suit probably would have been brought in a California court,
since no federal question, under the rule of Gully v. First National Bank,14
would have been presented to confer original jurisdiction upon the
federal district court. 15 In the absence of a "federal question" the state
court would have applied its own law, not federal law,1 6 and the outcome
of the suit might well have been reversed. The avoidance of just such
a divergence between state and federal rules of decision within the
same geographical area was the prime motivation behind the Erie doctrine.17 Likewise, the major reason for conflict of laws rules is that fairness to the parties requires that the outcome of litigation should not be
substantially affected by the choice of forum in which the suit is decided.18
Furthermore, suits brought under the Miller Act, dealing with certain
13 A similar interest was suggested as a basis for the application of federal law in a
tort suit by the government against one who had injured a soldier. United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) •
14 299 U .s. 109 (1936) •
15 But see Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question,'' 16 TuL. L. REv. 362
(1942).
16 This is graphically indicated by the federal-state split on the meaning and effect
of Exec. Order 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941), as amended, Exec. Order 9296, 8 Fed.
Reg. 1429 (1943) , which provided that government contractors shall not use contingent
fee agents to procure their contracts and shall warrant in their contracts that such
agents have not been used. The federal courts which have considered claims by such
agents for compensation under contingent fee contracts have uniformly held such contracts void and unenforceable. Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1951); Bradley v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 159 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Browne v. R. & R. Eng"r Co.,
164 F. Supp. 315 (D. Del. 1958) , rev'd on other grounds, 264 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1959);
Weitzel v. Brown-Neil Corp., 152 F. Supp. 540 (D.W.Va. 1957), afj'd, 251 F.2d 681 (4th
Cir. 1958); Ballard v. Tingue Mills, 128 F. Supp. 683 (D. Conn. 1954) . At the same
time the state courts, with near unanimity, have construed the Executive order as merely
providing a penalty against contractors for breach of the required warranty and
have allowed enforcement of the claims of such agents. Buckley v. Coyne Elec. School,
Inc., 343 Ill. App. 420, 99 N.E.2d 370 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 927 (1952); Gendron
v. Jacoby, 337 Mich. 150, 59 N.W.2d 128 (1953); Ebeling v. F. J. Swaine Mfg. Co.,
357 Mo. 549, 209 S.W.2d 892 (1948); A. H. Haeseler Bldg. & Contracting Co. v. John
J. Dupps Co., 129 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954). But see Federal Pac. Elec. Co. v.
McAdams, 207 Misc. 525, 139 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. City Ct. 1955). See Annot., Duty of
State Courts To Follow Dedsions of Federal Courts, Other Than the Supreme Court,
on Federal Questions, 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943).
17 See Mr. Justice Brandeis' majority opinion, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938). The
doctrine of Erie was held to apply to suits in equity in Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938). In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941),
it was held that federal courts must also apply the conflict of laws rules of the states
in which they sit.
18 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 4 (3d ed. 1949).
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types of government subcontracts,19 may present the same federal interest
in national security which is here involved, and yet Congress has seen
fit to allow state law to apply in those cases.20 Since there is no clearly
defined federal statutory policy which requires a uniform federal rule
applicable to this case, and the Rules of Decision Act21 appears to require
the application of state law in the absence of such a clearly defined
federal policy, it would seem that, congressional intent also militates
against this expansion of the exception to the Erie doctrine.
H. C. Snyder, Jr.

10 Under 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270b (a) (1958), "every person who has
furnished labor or material" is given the right to sue contractors covered by § 270 (a) •
§ 270b (b) provides: "Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the
name of the United States for the use of the person suing, in the United States District
Court for any district in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not
elsewhere, irrespective of the amount in controversy in such suit .•••"
20 See cases cited note 9 supra, indicating that state law has been applied in determining rights and obligations under these contracts with more than twenty-five years
of congressional acquiescence.
21 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958) •

